The Open Question Argument

The open question argument (henceforth OQA) runs as follows: Any attempt to define moral property ‘m’ in terms of natural property ‘n’ would, if successful, render the question “I know x is n, but is it m?” equivalent to the questioning of the tautology “I know x is n, but is it n?” That is to say, if m=n it ought to be a closed question whether something being n implies therefore that it is m. However, in point of fact, any natural property we pick as ‘n’ will always allow for open questions of the form “I know x is n, but is it m?” Therefore, no such attempted definition can ever be successful. An example should make the point utterly plain. Suppose it is argued that ‘goodness’ (m) is in fact identical with ‘that which causes me pleasure’ (n). If this were the case it should be obvious (closed) what the answer to “I know, as a sadist, that torturing kittens causes me pleasure, but is it good?” – Because this should be equivalent to the question “I know… that torturing kittens causes me pleasure, but is it that which causes me pleasure?” However, in fact, it is obvious that the question is not at all trivial (hence, open) and that therefore the analysis has failed. Note that the OQA doesn't require that you say it is false that X is m, given that it is n - only that the question is intelligible and not to be resolved by a lesson in laws of logic and rules of substitution.

The Frankena objection is that such an argument is question begging. For, in order for out intuitions about “I know X is n, but is it m?” to be worth listening to we must suppose they are disposed to lead us to truth. In this case, that means supposing that they accurately tell us m=/=n. But m=/=n is exactly what the OQA sets out to demonstrate, hence the OQA is circular, or question begging.

The Frankena objection has come to be seen as fairly decisive against the OQA, however, I’m not so convinced. Firstly, the Frankena objection seems to rest on bare possibility to get its conclusion through. Yes of course, we might say, it might be the case that otherwise competent concept users are all disposed to reject an analysis despite its correctness, but what of it? To insist that this means we cannot trust their judgement on the matter seems akin to suggesting that since we may all be mistaken with regards to the external world (some Cartesian spirit having fooled us) we must therefore accept we have no basis to believe in the external world. Far more plausible, it would seem, is to suppose that actually the analysis has just failed to capture what we mean by the moral term in question, which is why there seem to be open questions. (It is even worse if one is proposing a reversionary analysis, for then the OQA shows that nobody wants your revision!)

For another thing, despite what I just said about bare possibility, I’m not so sure it is even that. For the opponent of the OQA may supplement the Frankena objection with some story which purports to show why language users are disposed to reject their analysis despite its accuracy. But, we may ask, is there any evidence which could possibly be strong enough to defeat the fact that people just don’t want to use the word that way? When it comes to deciding if something is an acceptable move, what could be more damning than learning that this is not how people play the game? For exactly what the OQA seems to show is that whatever you try and reduce the good (or other moral properties) to, people will be inclined, in some cases, to think that perhaps the two could come apart. If something is to overcome this sort of evidence, it would have to be powerful enough to make one think that actually the initial question is evidently closed, not just that despite its seemingly being open it is in fact closed. And this sort of evidence is exactly what opponents of the OQA are never able to provide.